There are a lot of “leaks” regarding the discussions about a new hostage exchange arrangement. A number of the parties involved would be happy to see some kind of agreement reached before the Muslim fast month of Ramadan. This results in a lot of optimistic data getting out to the media, even when there is little reason to be optimistic. Israel appears to be steadfast in preparing for operations inside Rafah. Egypt is making preparations for this to happen (while denying that it is actually doing so). The US has an eye on the upcoming elections and wants to have a Palestinian State in order to have a Saudi Israeli deal. The existence of such a state has been a Saudi condition for that to occur. Hamas still is insisting on a permanent cease-fire and IDF withdrawal (and more humanitarian aid). Israel has already declared that here will be no permanent cease-fire, but has not rules out a temporary cease-fire. Possibly on a 1 day halt for each hostage released. It’s not easy to follow the maneuvering, even when you have a scorecard.
Hamas still has the capability to launch rockets at Israeli towns, and actually does so. But the real rocket barrages are coming from Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israeli counter strikes are inflicting enough damage to make non Hezbollah Lebanese complain to Nasrallah that he should stop. So far, these complaints haven’t produced any results. Even a reported message from Iran telling Hezbollah not to go too far seems to have had no effect. Of course the deafening public silence of most countries about the illegality of shooting rockets at civilian targets continues. After all, if they won’t complain about Russia doing the same thing in Ukraine, why should they talk about it happening in the Middle East?
There two other focal points for violence in our neighborhood. The relatively mild attacks by the US (and UK) on the Houtis in Yemen has not caused even a small alteration in behavior. Add to that Turkey bombing Kurdish positions again (possibly provoked by a Kurdish attack). Altogether the short term forecast still looks like bombing and shooting with occasional secondary explosions.
There are a lot of “leaks” regarding
the discussions about a new hostage exchange arrangement. A number of the
parties involved would be happy to see some kind of agreement reached before
the Muslim fast month of Ramadan. This results in a lot of optimistic data
getting out to the media, even when there is little reason to be optimistic. Israel
appears to be steadfast in preparing for operations inside Rafah. Egypt is making
preparations for this to happen (while denying that it is actually doing so).
The US has an eye on the upcoming elections and wants to have a Palestinian
State in order to have a Saudi Israeli deal. The existence of such a state has
been a Saudi condition for that to occur. Hamas still is insisting on a
permanent cease-fire and IDF withdrawal (and more humanitarian aid). Israel has
already declared that here will be no permanent cease-fire, but has not rules
out a temporary cease-fire. Possibly on a 1 day halt for each hostage released.
It’s not easy to follow the maneuvering, even when yoou have a scorecard.
Hamas still has the capability to
launch rockets at Israeli towns, and actually does so. But the real rocket
barrages are coming from Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israeli counter strikes are
inflicting enough damage to make non Hezbollah Lebanese complain to Nasrallah
that he should stop. So far, these complaints haven’t produced any results.
Even a reported message from Iran telling Hezbollah not to go too far seems to
have had no effect. Of course the deafening public silence of most countries
about the illegality of shooting rockets at civilian targets continues. After
all, if they won’t complain about Russia doing the same thing in Ukraine, why
should they talk about it happening in the Middle East?
There two other focal points for
violence in our neighborhood. The relatively mild attacks by the US (and UK) on
the Houtis in Yemen has not caused even a small alteration in behavior. Add to
that Turkey bombing Kurdish positons again (possibly provoked by a Kurdish
attack). Altogether the short term forecast still looks like bombing and
shooting with occasional secondary explosions.
Wetherhorn 